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This article examines how new types of performance appraisal reconfigure everyday 
personal relationships at work.  These systems deploy smartphone technologies to be used 
continuously by individuals to rate each other.  Our aim is to show, in concrete terms, how 
these practices claim to configure a space where individuals are liberated to express their 
views about each other’s work.  To the contrary, we argue that by being placed in continuous 
confrontation with each other’s ratings, the genuine space for democratic contestation, for the 
establishment of a genuine community, as well as for critique and dissent is – paradoxically – 
narrowed down.  The first section of this article explores the context in which managerialism 
has become consolidated at the centre of neo-liberal politics in a dialogue with some of 
Mouffe’s and Rancière’s arguments.  We use Rancière’s concept of ‘policing’ to understand 
how managerial techniques subvert genuine democratic spaces, modes of participation and 
expression.  Using performance appraisal systems as an example, the second part of the 
article provides a critical investigation which shows how managerialism intervenes at the 
very roots of possible democratic engagement.   
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1. Neo-liberalism and managerialism after 1989: a new kind of “democratic 
despotism”? 
 
The last decade witnessed the rapid proliferation of modalities of rating in most 
spheres of social life.  Whether products or services, the people who provide them, or work 
colleagues, we are increasingly invited to judge – often instantly – their value and 
performances.   Our opinions and value judgements are continuously elicited by ubiquitous 
public rating systems which claim to constitute platforms allowing the instantaneous 
expression of our preferences.  Increasingly, the value of objects, people, relationships, and 
institutions has come to depend on the scores obtained through these rating exercises.   
In the sphere of work, these modalities appear concretely in various performance 
appraisal systems entailing the assessment of each individual by all those surrounding them.  
The logic is that, based on continuous evaluations by everyone surrounding us, our ‘true’ 
individuality will be fully mobilised.  Whilst appearing democratic, liberating and 
emancipatory, we argue that such systems appropriate the moment of genuine judgement and 
deliberation using rigid frames of reference that fix how individuals can be perceived and 
judged by others.  The political and ethical consequences of performance appraisal 
frameworks amount therefore to a narrowing down of possibilities of genuine democratic 
expression and dissent.  In order to understand this paradox, we employ conceptual elements 
rooted in analyses by Rancière (2010) and Mouffe (2000, 2005) which show how such 
concrete managerial practices of appraisal can be seen as paradigmatic expressions of the 
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increasingly problematic relationship between (neo)liberalism and democracy.   Thus, the 
first section contextualises our analysis of the political and ethical significance of ubiquitous 
rating system within the consolidation of neoliberalism in the last three decades.  We 
examine how managerial practices have been central ingredients in this process, exploring 
how their rapid diffusion expands the range of what Rancière called “policing”.  The case of 
omnipresent rating systems is also an example of the paradox of highly managed instances of 
apparent democratic exercise which conceal their closely controlled character.  The following 
sections analyse concrete examples of systems of rating in the workplace.  We focus on 
performance appraisal systems whose growth over the last decades is being intensified by the 
use of various devices which make possible instantaneous systems of rating the worth of 
work colleagues.  We explore how such systems gradually place users in a relationship of 
reciprocal “policing” and thus how the space of collective democratic affinities and dissent is 
endangered. 
Of course, the relationship between (neo)liberal regimes and democratic practices has 
preoccupied political theorists (Barkan 2013; Brown 2015; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; 
Rancière 2010; Slobodian 2018; Wolin 2008) since the dawn of the post-communist era in 
Europe.  Among them, Mouffe (2000, 2005) has shown how aspects of democratic 
government have been subverted by the apparent triumph of a revived and increasingly 
hegemonic vision of global (neo)liberalism.  In the euphoria of the 1990s, various politicians 
and parties rushed to reinvent themselves as ‘centrists’, ‘modernisers’, seekers of a new 
‘way’ of managing (quite literally) the spoils of the victory of liberalism over modern 
totalitarianisms.  As Mouffe argues:  
 
Neo-liberal dogmas about the inviolable rights of property, the all-encompassing 
virtues of the market and the dangers of interfering with its logics constitute 
nowadays the ‘common sense’ in liberal-democratic societies. […] Blair’s ‘third way’ 
and Schröder’s ‘neue Mitte’ [‘new centre’], both inspired by Clinton’s strategy of 
‘triangulation’, accept the terrain established by their neo-liberal predecessors. (2000, 
p. 6)  
 
These regimes claimed that their project was genuinely ‘democratic’, legitimated 
historically by the popular will which overthrew communism in eastern Europe.  Were those 
movements of liberation not democratic in their very essence?  ‘Indeed!’ was the answer in 
western political circles.  So liberalism felt entitled to absorb ideas of democratic life as if 
they had always been its own, when, in fact, liberal principles “do not have their origin in the 
democratic discourse...” (Mouffe 2000, p. 2).  She also explains that the self-certainties and 
closed horizons of the liberal tradition “constituted by the rule of law, the defence of human 
rights and the respect of individual liberty” cannot be simply juxtaposed and imposed upon 
the complexity and openness of the democratic ideas of “equality, identity between governing 
and governed, and popular sovereignty” (2000, pp. 2–3).  Yet, renewed liberal ideologies 
claim the ability to resolve the inherent and irreducible incompatibility between individual 
liberty and popular sovereignty.  For Mouffe, this very claim “represents a threat for 
democratic institutions” (2000, p. 6) since “both perfect liberty and perfect equality [are] 
impossible” (2000, p. 10).  As a result, the productive democratic space for contesting the 
liberal consensus has been increasingly marginalised by a sentiment of moral certainty, while 
dissent itself became suspect and somewhat immoral, standing against the incontestable 
values of an unbounded individualism.   
This historical process did not take place simply in the realm of politics.  Various 
managerial discourses and practices also grew as parallel vectors for political optimism, and 
business itself is presented as a necessary condition for securing the historical promise of 
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modernity: self-assertive individualism (Du Gay 2004; Jones and Spicer 2005; Essers et al. 
2017; Hanlon 2018).  Indeed, in the 1990s, following a decade of Reaganite and Thatcherite 
politics, doctrines of entrepreneurial cultures (Rose 1990, 1998; Dean 2009; Bröckling 2015) 
and sanitised free markets (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009) replaced almost entirely traditional 
party programmes.  Politics was reduced to the administration and management of the body-
politic through ‘healthy’ business competition seen as essential in the expression of 
individualism.  The world was gradually reconceptualised through categories promising the 
end of political antagonisms:  
 
Notions such as 'partisan-free democracy', 'dialogic democracy', 'cosmopolitan 
democracy', 'good governance', 'global civil society', 'cosmopolitan sovereignty', 
'absolute democracy' […] all partake of a common anti-political vision which refuses 
to acknowledge the antagonistic dimension constitutive of 'the political'.  Their aim is 
the establishment of a world 'beyond left and right', 'beyond hegemony', 'beyond 
sovereignty' and 'beyond antagonism'. (Mouffe 2005, p. 2) 
 
Despite claims to a genuine emancipatory project for individuality, this image of 
consensus led, paradoxically, to the closure of spaces for democratic self-expression.  On the 
contrary, neoliberal visions are predicated upon a homogenous conception of individuality 
which Foucault called “Homo oeconomicus [as] an entrepreneur of himself.” (2008, p. 226)  
Possible spaces for self-expression were rapidly occupied by universal, yet empty tropes, 
such as the freedom to ‘self-actualise’, or as the self-styled ‘#1 life and business strategist’, 
Tony Robbins, exhorts us: “Don’t settle for anything less than you can be! Make your life a 
masterpiece!” (in Curtis 2002).  As Foucault anticipated,  
 
… the stake in all neoliberal analyses is the replacement every time of homo 
oeconomicus as partner of exchange with a homo oeconomicus as entrepreneur of 
himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer. (2008, 
p. 226) 
 
The main principle of (neo)liberalism (the ethos and ethics of individual freedom) 
now lies beyond political debate, contestation or dissent.  Such dissent would appear as a 
moral offence, and as a gesture of coercion similar to the totalitarian mentalities now 
overthrown by historical consensus: “Individual liberty can only be understood in a negative 
way as absence of coercion.” (Mouffe 1993, p. 62; also Mirowski and Plehwe 2009, p. 437)  
To question this principle is not just politically insensitive, but, morally, almost impossible 
because no individual could stand legitimately against others without violating the principle 
itself.   
The dangers to democracy identified by Mouffe and others recall de Tocqueville’s 
(2003 [1832]) penetrating early critique and warnings about the dangers of despotism within 
the fabric of democratic nations.  Asking, “What sort of despotism democratic nations have to 
fear” (2003, p. 803), de Tocqueville argued that democratic authority, both public and 
private, has a paradoxical tendency to concentrate power in the name of benign guarantees of 
securing individual freedom.  The political space would acquire, consequently, a new 
character: “The very constitutions and needs of democracies make it inevitable that their 
sovereign authority has to be more uniform, centralized, widespread, searching, and powerful 
than in any other nation.” (2003, p. 810)  To ensure the comprehensive guardianship of 
liberty, the modern democratic institutions tend to become co-extensive with the social body 
as a whole because the normative requirements for peaceful coexistence in a society of equals 
have to infuse every single aspect of human interaction. So, de Tocqueville argues, “above 
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these men stands an immense and protective power which alone is responsible for looking 
after their enjoyments and watching over their destiny. It is absolute, meticulous, ordered, 
provident, and kindly disposed.” (2003, p. 805)  He draws our attention precisely to the 
positive character of the rules claiming every individual: “public customs become more 
humane and gentler as men grow more alike and equal.” (2003, p. 804)  In this way, the 
system of governance grounds its claims to authority in the name of benevolence and 
kindness of a paternal sort.   
The ethos avowed by “democratic despotism” has to be further emphasised.  As 
opposed to the repressive instincts of totalitarian regimes, modern democracy operates in the 
register of ethical and moral positivity.  It does not seek to rule from “above”, but from 
among equal individuals, as it were, whose own benevolence and kindness has to be 
individually ensured.  This subtle shift, de Tocqueville argues, means that governing now 
moves into the territory of the individual soul, with its inclinations and actions, which 
therefore has to be rendered visible and manageable.  Individual sensibilities become objects 
targeted by political rule in as much as the individual is the very substance of liberal 
democratic politics.  For de Tocqueville, democratic rule appears,  
 
… like a fatherly authority, if, fatherlike, its aim were to prepare men for manhood, 
but it seeks only to keep them in perpetual childhood; it prefers its citizens to enjoy 
themselves provided they have only enjoyment in mind. It works readily for their 
happiness but it wishes to be the only provider and judge of it. It provides their 
security, anticipates and guarantees their needs, supplies their pleasures, directs their 
principal concerns, manages their industry, regulates their estates, divides their 
inheritances. […] Equality has prepared men for all this, inclining them to tolerate all 
these things and often even to see them as a blessing. (2003, pp. 805–6) 
 
This is the paradox identified by Mouffe too: “The democratic nations which 
introduced freedom into politics at the same time that they were increasing despotism in the 
administrative sphere have been led into the strangest paradoxes.” (de Tocqueville 2003, p. 
808)  As the “administrative sphere” becomes one of the concrete dimensions of governance,   
de Tocqueville emphasises how “democratic despotism” articulates its claims in a positive 
and productive ethical register.  Behind an affirming vocabulary for the management and 
administration of everyday life, opportunities for dissent and contestation are gradually and 
subtly eroded.   
Within this context, we aim to investigate certain processes through which new spaces 
of governance are shaped by this positivity, and how it envelops the purportedly free 
individual.  Our argument will highlight how, cloaked in the positive vocabularies of liberal 
individualism, we can witness the corrosion of possibilities of genuine political contestation 
and dissent.  To capture how a tendency toward “democratic despotism” manifests in the 
managerial sphere, one further conceptual step is necessary.  It appears in Thesis 7, of the 
“Ten Theses On Politics” in Rancière’s Dissensus (2010, pp. 27–44).  It offers a distinction 
needed for understanding the possibility of a viable democratic space, a space where there is 
a genuine opening for political freedom: 
 
Thesis 7. Politics stands in distinct opposition to the police. The police is a 
distribution of the sensible (partage du sensible) whose principle is the absence of 
void and of supplement. (2010, p. 36) 
 
Rancière explains “police” as the process by which social and symbolic orders are 
first constituted, and not as a mere administrative institution.  “Police” entails the 
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establishment of categories, boundaries and modes of conduct which become objects of what 
can and cannot be admitted into the legitimate political space and what cannot – or ought not 
– even be seen, heard, perceived at all.  Rancière’s key category – the “distribution of the 
sensible” – explains how policing works in contradistinction to the political.  “Sensible” 
refers to the ensemble of elementary experiences.  What is society allowed to see, hear, listen 
to, and partake in?  What is allowed to appear as legitimate behaviour?  What law, in other 
words,  defines “the forms of partaking” characterising a body-politic at its very basis?  This 
is, for Rancière, the essence of the police.  It is not simply a function through which a society 
manages the upholding of its laws.  Rather, policing is the manner in which law is established 
by allocating legitimacy at the most basic level of every possible social gesture, individual or 
collective, that is, at the level of the sensory experience itself:  
 
A partition of the sensible refers to the manner in which a relation between a shared 
common meaning (un commun partagé) and the distribution of exclusive parts is 
determined in sensory experience. […] [It] presupposes a distribution of what is 
visible and what not, of what can be heard and what cannot. (ibid.)   
 
What Rancière describes is not only the establishment of an administrative system, 
but also the constitution of an ethical order.  Within that order, values are not predicated as 
possible aspirations, or choices, for social and political life.  Rather, they appear as exclusive 
modes in which a ‘good life’ has to be lived and whose adoption becomes self-evident and 
beyond choice.  There is thus no space left, no “void”, in Rancière’s sense, in which any 
individual or collective element of society can add, or “supplement”, alternative realities and 
conceptions of a ‘good life’, or be free to explore other versions of the “sensible”, other 
avenues of thinking about what it might mean for human existence to unfold.  “Society”, 
Rancière argues, thus becomes a closed space, 
 
… made up of groups tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which these 
occupations are exercised, and to modes of being corresponding to these occupations 
and these places.  In this matching of functions, places and ways of being, there is no 
place for any void. It is this exclusion of what ‘is not’ that constitutes the police-
principle at the core of statist practices. (ibid.) 
 
Politics changes its goal and the nature of its functioning.  Assuming societal 
consensus, democratic life becomes ‘administration’, “policing” as opposed to “politics”.  
Within this broad process, one of the areas in which “policing” shapes practical politics is 
that of managerialism.  Among the most significant features of contemporary political 
practices is the emergence of a “new class of managers”, a political vector whose spread, 
“wealth and power” have become firmly entrenched beyond formal political institutions 
(Mouffe 2000, p. 15).  Meanwhile, as we explore below, everyday existence comes to be 
governed by an increasingly authoritarian and widely disseminated vocabulary of 
individuality and self-assertion.  This idiom is proclaimed by complex, quasi-private cultural 
and social systems of “power relations which structure contemporary post-industrial 
societies.” (Mouffe 2000, p. 15)  As these scholars argue, managerialism underpins an all-
encompassing administrative political mechanism which merits detailed examination in order 
to highlight the limits and inherent dangers of the neoliberal promises of a general consensus.   
One of the dimensions of systems of management and business administration is their 
tendency to become frameworks of “policing”.  Through them, everyday lives are ordered, 
normed, softened and bent, whilst their procedures claim to mobilise and liberate ‘true’ 
individuality.  Against this background, our aim is to explore ethical dangers arising from the 
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growth and diffusion of managerialism through performance rating systems in contemporary 
organisations.  Through them, we seek to explore critically how managerialism contributes to 
the radical transformation of the democratic gesture of voting into a constant process of 
rating.  We suggest that the last decade witnessed an intensified deployment of modalities of 
rating in most spheres of social life, increasingly invading spaces of possible democratic 
debate, collective association and dissent.  In this way, democracy’s roots are, as Wolin 
(2008) shows, increasingly “managed” through, and “incorporated” into, an ethics of life 
understood as an individualistic process of self-construction (through what Heelas called “the 
self-work ethic”, 2002, p. 80).   
This article explores how this individualistic “political rationality” (ref. Brown 2015, 
pp. 115–150) appears in concrete managerial practices.  We focus upon a particular kind of 
practice (performance rating systems) because it allows us to examine in detail the uneasy 
relationship between democracy and (neo)liberalism, and how spaces for dissent are 
narrowed and marginalised.  We aim to contribute to investigations such as those suggested 
by Mouffe, Rancière, and Wolin (among others) by highlighting how the power of these 
“policing” practices stems from the positive articulation of their ethical imperatives.  
Claiming to offer ‘positive’ opportunities for the expression of one’s ‘true’ character, such 
rating systems seek to “police” personal self-understanding, as well as relationships of work, 
consumption, service, and interpersonal sociality. 
 
2. The ‘policing’ of performance in contemporary managerial practices 
 
How does Rancière’s thesis on policing appear in action?  If its power concerns the 
very establishment of what is morally legitimate for social and political order, then we must 
seek this process as it operates through the fabric of everyday existence.  For such an 
investigation, we argue, the study of management practices provides a rich empirical domain.  
Managerialism has become, in the last decades, the stage of an increasingly intense 
reordering of the symbolic constitution of organisations, work and the ethics of work.  
Among these practices, the proliferation of regimes of performance management and 
appraisal in social life offers one of the best sources for such an investigation.   
Among other features, managerial control has shifted its attention from production 
and productivity, to performance and performativity (Thrift 2002).  The focus of control thus 
shifts from what is being produced, to who individuals become as they work and how they 
appear through their performative qualities (Alvesson and Spicer 2012; Heelas 2002; Knights 
and Willmott 1989; O’Doherty 2005; Rhodes and Harvey 2012; Thrift 2002; Townley 1993, 
1994).  Thrift (2002, p. 225) explained this shift through the rise of a new “style” of 
management “in which certain things that were previously invisible are now made visible and 
so available to be operated on”, resulting in new managerial practices attempting to 
reconfigure every aspect of conduct and its ethos.  His analyses (as well as Heelas’s 2002) 
resemble closely Rancière’s understanding of policing as the minute redistribution of 
subjectivity.  “Generally speaking”, Thrift writes, “style is a means of making different things 
significant and worthy of notice [and] will therefore include the creation of new metaphors, 
stories, concepts, percepts and affects.” (2002, p. 202)   
Perhaps one of the most illustrative instances is the dissemination of systems of 360-
degree performance appraisal.  Claiming to democratise and balance the process through 
which any individual’s performance is measured, by removing all hierarchical boundaries, 
these systems have begun to shape in complex ways what counts as worthwhile work.  The 
politics of the appraisal relationship is radically reframed from a one-to-one, manager-
subordinate assessment process, to a flattened, all-inclusive rating of every individual by all 
others with whom she or he interacts.  What results is a very different community in 
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workplaces where every individual rates and is rated, and every interaction falls under the 
spell of this new managerial gesture.  What any individual does becomes secondary to how 
any individual appears to others: ‘how do I look?’, ‘am I liked, approved, accepted?’, or ‘am 
I going to be rated low, voted down, because I appear to be out of line?’.  Every interaction 
and reaction becomes increasingly dangerous, politically charged, and potentially isolating.  
The individual is increasingly exposed to the possibility that  he or she will fall short in 
colleagues’ perceptions and the ratings will show it.   
Such intense performative measures transform a work community into an audience 
rating individual performances.  As a consequence, an individual’s appraisal becomes a 
confrontation with his or her audience’s ratings.  The logic of this type of appraisal is to 
distribute its ethical demands and “contaminate”, as Mouffe argues (2000, p. 10), every 
aspect of the social space of work.  By drawing the ‘audience’ in, everyone is invited, as it 
were, to comment upon the quality of performance, without the actor’s possibility to 
“negotiate” (ibid.) and contest such judgements.   The silencing of dissent is justified by the 
system’s claim that its intention is to be a genuinely positive, developmental and 
incontestable, moment of truth.  Who could deny or contest the opportunity to ‘further 
improve’ skills, knowledge, abilities, and traits?  The collective judgement appears therefore 
as a mirror of an individual’s performance, held up ‘in peace’ rather than in conflict.  By 
obliging every individual to face their ‘true’ place in the social space of work, the effect can 
be overwhelming.  How could any single individual refuse to admit collective, collegial 
ratings?  How could anyone contest them when ‘everyone says so’?  Perhaps the most brutal 
version of this system was Jack Welch’s “forced ranking” process (dubbed “rank and yank”) 
at General Electric,  which rated so-called ‘management talent’ as “A players” for the top 
20%, “B players” for the middle 70%, and “C players” for the bottom 10% who became 
possible subjects of dismissal (Welch and Byrne 2001; Scullen et al. 2005; Cheese et al. 
2007).  At Netflix, this kind of practice is called the “’keeper test’ – a mantra for firing people 
who don't fit the culture and ensuring only the strongest survive.” (Shalini and Flint 2018)  
This is how management opens up a space which makes explicit what individuality 
ought to be, how the ideal performative subject ought to behave, and how ‘spectators’ ought 
to rate colleagues.  In Rancière’s terms, this is where management practices become directly 
involved in “policing” and standardising the interior qualities of idealised working subjects.  
Whereas, at first sight, these rating practices claim to allow individuality to express itself, 
their underlying logic is the alignment of every individual to a set system of values and 
modes of conduct. 
How does this unfold concretely?  An example of such “policing” practices arose 
from an empirical research project conducted between 1998 and 2000, in one of the 
Manchester branches of Barclays Bank.  The aim of the project was to understand how 
central corporate HRM practices were disseminated throughout the organisation and the 
reactions they elicited (based on Townley’s approach – 1993, 1994).  In the summer of 1999, 
a new appraisal system was circulated to all employees whose central component was a 
brochure entitled Personal Attributes Dictionary.  The relatively small, A5-landscape, 
booklet officially distributed to every employee made it appear undaunting, easy to approach.   
Written in a light, didactic, almost innocent style, it could not hide its moralising tone and 
purpose.  Over more than forty pages, this “dictionary” (a word indicating its referential 
status) provided – in remarkable detail and a remarkable ethical idiom – precisely what 
Rancière calls the “distribution of the sensible”, seeking to render visible and measurable 
every aspect of behaviour, every possible personal stance and trait deemed significant, or, in 
Barclays’ words, all “the things we say, think and do” (2000, p. 1).  As Rancière notes, no 
“void” was to be left for the expression of any “supplement” of individual and collective 
identity constituting the elementary premise of democratic engagement.   
8 
This document illustrates how inter-personal rating dissolves the possibility of dissent 
and the possibility of forming a community legitimately able to contest and resist it.  Two 
dimensions are notable in the context of our argument.  The first is the subtle mechanism 
through which the ethics of this dictionary ought to be assimilated.  The section entitled 
“How to use this dictionary” is one of those almost innocuous moments in which “policing” 
occurs: 
 
Whether we want to read all of the dictionary immediately or use it as the need arises, it is 
important that we visualise people we know or work with when we look at the behaviours the 
dictionary describes. 
 
Try the following short exercise to see how the dictionary works: 
• Look at the contents page and choose one of the personal attributes. 
• Think of two people you know, one of whom you think is good at this particular 
attribute, and one who needs to improve. 
• For each of them, write down what you think it is about their behaviour that makes 
them good or bad at it. 
• Now write down how you behave in relation to the personal attribute, and be honest 
with yourself – nobody else will see this. 
• Look up your personal attribute in the dictionary and compare what you felt was 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ with what the dictionary describes as ‘effective’ behaviour and that 
which ‘needs developing’. How different are they? 
• Now compare your own behaviour with what you find in the dictionary. What do 
you need to develop? (Barclays Bank 2000, p. 4) 
 
Written so simply and so self-evidently, every clause traces a politics of enclosing and 
exposing the individual within a system claiming its legitimacy by offering an opportunity for  
“self-development”.  How could it be refused?  Who would be able to dissent?  The subtle 
and, indeed, sensorial framing of a new kind of relationship between individuals, one of 
judgement and self-judgement, of validation and invalidation, reveals the ethical stakes in 
such managerial techniques.  “Visualising” colleagues and inscribing them as instances of the 
“good” and the “bad”, being invited to make judgements of their character as if these 
judgements occur merely in one’s inner forum (“nobody else needs to see this”), exhorts 
individuals to the kind of “policing” gesture from which there is almost no return.  How 
could anyone forget what he or she has secretly thought was the ‘true character’ of 
colleagues?  If truth is the stake in such exercises (“be honest with yourself”) then it would be 
a moral failure to forsake it just because it places one in direct antagonism with others and 
one’s self.  The way in which this simple text raises the problem of moral judgement, the 
manner in which it seeks to open up and control the gestures of valuation of self and others, 
touch the deepest roots that form one’s identity and sense of belonging to a community.  By 
trying to break into this inner place of self-definition, such techniques exhibit one of the most 
“threatening” (in Mouffe’s and Rancière’s sense) modes through which political will can be 
“policed”. 
The second, and equally subtle, dimension of Barclays’ document is the “Dictionary 
of Attributes” itself, a 44-page list of increasingly forceful descriptions of ‘good’ and ‘bad 
behaviours’ to which every member of the organisation ought to pay heed.  These are indexed 
in six major categories: “business focus, people focus, personal focus, change focus, 
analytical focus, and quality focus” (2000, p. 5).  Each is further divided into twenty-eight 
dimensions of behaviour encompassing almost every possible aspect of working life: from 
“meeting customer needs”, to “involving people”, from “self-confidence” and 
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“determination” to “analysis and judgement” as well as capacity for “verbal” and “written” 
communication, from “thoroughness” to “self-control”, and – finally – personal “integrity”.  
For every dimension, the brochure dedicates an entire page (sometimes two) split into two 
columns: on the left, one describing “effective” behaviours, on the right, one for behaviours 
which “needs [sic] developing”.  The two labels outline – without mentioning explicitly – the 
character-types displaying those respective traits.  The diagnostic tone of the syntagm “needs 
developing” must not be ignored in its forcefulness: ‘you, X, need developing in light of the 
ratings you have received!’  Of course, there is hope for you because there is always a cure: 
the therapy for ‘effectiveness’ is on the same page.  And who would not want to be cured of 
the afflictions detailed in this document?   




Shares the glory, uses achievers as 
examples, praising and rewarding publicly, 
making them feel valued and appreciated;  
 
Leads by example and shows personal 
enthusiasm by explaining why things need 
doing and benefits to be derived; 
 
Gives clear direction by setting realistic 
targets, timescales and deadlines; 
 
Sets up structured systems so the team know 
what plan is in place and how performance 
will be monitored, then provides feedback 
on results; 
 
Knows when to "be the boss" and when to 
muck in - does not have favourites 
 
Needs developing  
 
Destroys morale by focusing on the 
negatives or by making demands without 
gaining acceptance; 
 
Demonstrates no personal commitment to 
objectives; 
 
Abdicates responsibility or retains too much 
ownership by not delegating; 
 
Has little impact on the team, things happen 
around them rather than because of them; 
 
Leaves people to own devices so they do 
not know what is expected of them; 
 
Gives no encouragement to people; 
 
Does not set stretching goals or sets 
impossible timescales with unrealistic 
targets; 
 




Simple, common-sensical, but desirable and seemingly meaningful, these statements 
can be recognised by everybody.  This is a technique, but one that does not employ technical 
language of any kind.  It relies on the assumed self-evidence of common sense and this is 
precisely its intention.  Nobody reading this page can disagree with its programme.  Almost 
by default, ‘we all’, as it were, have to agree that these are desirable traits, and the burden of 
proof is on anyone who might express reservation.  But this kind of common-sensical 
statement is flawed in a fundamental respect.  None of the characterisations of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ behaviour described here are in any sense measurable because they are indeterminate. 
How could they be used for assessing each other’s performance?  What does “sharing the 
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glory” actually mean, what is the content of such a category, and at whose discretion lies its 
measure?  And how can “not having favourites” be assessed? 
Perhaps two more examples would illustrate further the argument we are making.  
With respect to “verbal communication”, the character who “needs developing” is described 
in no less remarkable terms.  According to the dictionary, he or she is, 
 
- Inarticulate; 
- Shows lack of interest in subject matter – Monotonous and reads from a piece of 
paper word for word; 
- Waffles and goes off at a tangent; 
- Wrong level of voice – mumbles or raises voice inappropriately. (p. 15) 
 
As for the rubric entitled “Self Control”, the person diagnosed as ‘needing 
developing’ appears as follows: 
 
- Flustered – runs around panicking; 
- Takes the reactions of other people very personally; 
- Appears childish, petulant; 
- Loses cool, becomes aggressive or defensive; 
- Bottles up stress and explodes – takes out frustrations on others. (p. 20) 
 
What do such descriptions have in common?  How do they make sense?  Unfolding 
on page after page, the booklet is relentless in producing increasingly intimate criteria for 
moral judgement.  Read as a whole, it is impossible not to notice its contradictions: the same 
kind of behaviour which constitutes ‘effectiveness’ under one rubric, becomes problematic in 
another.  But the reader was instructed to pick aspects “as the need arises” and so 
inconsistencies would be less obvious.  Moreover, these statements cannot possibly form the 
basis of any sensible, remotely objective judgement – especially when everybody is invited to 
judge everybody else in these terms.  How can it function then?  As soon as the reader ceases 
to look for the rationality of these categories, and seeks to understand their ethos, a whole 
new sense of its meaningfulness begins to emerge.  The last page of the brochure offers a key 
to understanding the ethics and politics underlying the whole text.  Entitled “Integrity” (p. 




Is truthful, honest and trustworthy;  
 
Is seen as fair and unbiased - deals with 




Is open and truthful even if a difficult 
message needs to be delivered; 
 
Adopts and embraces the Group Values; 
 
Takes personal responsibility for actions 
and does not hide behind the Bank's name; 
Needs developing 
 
Tells lies, gossips, betrays confidence; 
 
Biased and unfair, focuses on personalities 
not facts; 
 
Makes promises which cannot be delivered; 
 
Liable to bluff to conceal gaps in knowledge 
- does not point out the facts; 
 
Does not take Group [i.e. the Bank’s] 




Does not bluff - admits when an answer is 
not known; 
 
Advises the customer of the facts and what 
can/cannot be delivered. 
Cynical, ready to find fault and is critical of 
the Bank. 
 
Could there be higher praise of, or worse indictments against, one’s character than 
these?  Who would not be afraid to be judged against such criteria? Yet who could claim to 
ever satisfy them?  Barclays’ instrument is not just a performance management tool, but a 
much more complex moral and political statement.  It contains a simplistic, but powerful 
programme of “policing” in whose name rating and being rated can bring up a sense of 
permanent potential threat from multiple angles, at just about every turn.  The power of these 
statements lies in what appears as banal vernacular language, but a language drawn by 
extrapolating minimally reflexive, forceful and all-too-common binary moral and ethical 
distinctions.  This language is part of a symbolic order characterised, in Lefort’s formulation, 
by “the dissolution of the markers of certainty” (1988, p. 19, original italics).  Its effects are 
most acute at the level of conduct in immediate personal relationships, when the seeds of the 
thought of dissent itself could take root.   
These effects become more pronounced when managerial language relies upon words 
claiming to define systems of values, when in fact they themselves can neither be defined nor 
explained, words Hans Blumenberg (2007) called “non-concepts”.  What is the meaning of 
“flustered”, “waffle”, or “liable to bluff”?  How can they be conceptually delineated, 
objectified, and therefore measured?  The reality is that they cannot be – but what they do 
actually deliver is an immediate and painful sense of moral judgement upon whoever seeks to 
dissent from them.  Every individual, especially at work, would be afraid to be judged in such 
negative (almost insulting) terms and would therefore instinctively seek to avoid the pain of 
such judgements.  Left isolated by such a framework of appraisal, it seems almost impossible 
to exercise the essential freedom to ask: ‘what do such words even mean?’.  Touching every 
aspect of character and carrying such significant risks, it would be hard not to surrender the 
freedom of questioning such practices which seek to order communities through conceptually 
meaningless, yet morally powerful, categories.   
Yet, even if interpreted as non-conceptual, it does not mean that this language is 
meaningless or ineffective.  To the contrary, its effectiveness lies in the power of its 
‘positivity’, its claim to be binding, unavoidable and impossible to resist (“law”-like, in 
Rancière’s sense).  Such language seeks to tie every individual to its ethics, however false it 
may be in its substance.  Why are such non-concepts so ethically effective?  The answer 
seems to reside in their ability to name (but not conceptualise) traits which are held in 
common-sense to be ‘valuable’ in some significant way.  There is, in other words, sufficient 
apparent consensus surrounding such characterisations that they become capable of 
manufacturing a kind of unwritten ‘law’ for ‘policing’ a particular form of life.  They are 
always hard to dissent from and resist in individual isolation.  Barclays’ Personal Attributes 
Dictionary is, in this sense, a direct illustration of “policing” in action, illustrating Rancière’s 
conception of the “distribution of the sensible” through which “groups [are] tied to specific 
modes of doing, to places in which these occupations are exercised, and to modes of being 





3. Rating, appraisals, and “policing”: from corporate management and social 
media, to state politics  
 
A more recent example showing both the continuity, as well as the changing and 
totalising character of such appraisal systems, appears in an article published McKinsey’s 
Quarterly (Ewenstein et al. 2016).  Entitled Ahead of the curve: The future of performance 
management, the subtitle asks: “What happens after companies jettison traditional year-end 
evaluations?”  It indicates the increasing discomfort with “the yearly ritual of evaluating (and 
sometimes rating and ranking) the performance of employees” which has come “[to] 
epitomize the absurdities of corporate life.” (2016, p. 64)  And so the search is on for a new 
generation of performance appraisal systems that would no longer run the risk of being 
perceived “as time consuming, excessively subjective, demotivating, and ultimately 
unhelpful.” (ibid.)  A new trend, The Economist (2016) noted, is emerging as major global 
corporations such as Accenture, Adobe, Deloitte, GE, IBM, Microsoft and Netflix are 
abandoning yearly reviews.  Replacing them are “systems that automate real-time analyses” 
by “collecting more objective performance data” (Ewenstein et al. 2016, p. 65).  The authors 
describe, in pure technocratic terms, the emergence of patterns of performance rating 
claiming to remove biases of subjectivity and of periodic focus.  In addition, the very word 
‘appraisal’ is gradually replaced by the apparently more democratic and positive notion of 
“real-time feedback.” (Ewenstein et al. 2016, p. 69) 
Their argument is two-fold: the future of performance appraisal ought to lie with 
systems which make the process of rating both permanent, “real-time” (rather than periodic),  
and increasingly effortless.  Only in this way, the authors propose, will such systems become 
truly fair and objective, as well as inescapable and more democratic.  What is advocated (like 
Barclays did two decades ago) is the total diffusion of a multi-dimensional system of inter-
personal rating throughout work organisations.  The difference now is the technical 
possibility of smart phone applications that render the gesture of rating colleagues as 
immediate and as ‘simple’ as that of clicking ‘like’ or ‘dislike’, one star or five, with regard 
to any person, product or service.  The rating of performance (whether in a meeting, through 
a presentation, or any gesture however insignificant) should become no different than rating 
anyone else’s interventions on Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter, or any product bought on 
Amazon.  Indeed, as we are witnessing since 2016, global political leadership itself can be 
exercised through such systems whose brevity (such as Twitter’s) and directness (such as 
Facebook’s legendary ‘likes’) seem to render all interactions and intentions unmistakeably 
clear. 
The authors therefore present, towards the end of the article, an “Exhibit” [Fig. 1] 
which shows how such a performance rating application would work.  It is already being 
trialled by Zalando, a fashion internet retailer, whose corporate culture video captures the 
ethos of both individual and collective understandings of a workplace from which all conflict 
and negative associations have been removed (Zalando 2018).   
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[Figure 1. Source: Ewenstein et al. 2016, p. 70] 
 
The caption synthesises this logic: “Continually crowdsourcing performance data 
provides fresher and more timely insights.”  On the one hand, using the now popular label 
“crowdsourcing” seems to be a calculated appropriation of one  trope used in internet 
communications by various groups to mobilise goodwill and charitable resources in new 
collective forms of social interaction.  Using “crowdsourcing” to justify managerial 
procedures eschews the possibility of critique because the procedure appears as if it belongs 
to the collective body of the workforce subject to it, erasing the critical distance required for 
dissent and resistance.  The word ‘crowd’ itself is an apparent democratic gesture of 
inclusion,  closing off the possibilities of critique and opposition.  On the other hand, 
anticipating that this process would become ‘continuous’ indicates the relentless rhythm of 
performance rating.  Such rating finds its relevance precisely because it claims to keep up 
with the speed and rhythm of the idealised employee mobilised and invested in ‘creative 
work’.  In the words of one of Zalando’s employees, Teresa, “You get picked up with this 
wave and, once you get going and you’re in a sprint, nobody is going to stop you!” (“About 
Zalando Culture” 2018, minute 1'00"-1'07" ); Rani offer a brief but significant addition: “It 
always makes me walk on my toes…” (idem, minute 1’14”-1’16”).   
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Why would this be the case?  The answer might be found in some of the key words 
presented in the image used in the McKinsey article.  Like Barclays’, they describe the 
‘metrics’ proposed for the application.  The rating scale ranges from “rubbish” to “great”.  
This is not a scale from one ‘star’ to five, or some other neutral or even slightly inexpressive 
form.  Rather, the words “rubbish” and “great” (so widespread in current popular jargon and 
used so indiscriminately) are not functional categories of technocratic assessment, but 
categories obliging the one who rates to a strong moral judgement.  They ought to raise an 
immediate objection: who would dare make such pronouncements about any of our 
colleagues?  Who would use such words in any face-to-face conversation about someone 
else’s work?  We instinctively know that such words are insulting, shameful, as well as 
meaningless.  They are not readily used in any exchange, if that exchange is to retain any 
measure of civility.  Yet management consultants anticipate their use as scales through which 
we could imagine rating each other at work.  These words (like in Barclays’ case) are not 
isolated.  Below the scale appear other criteria that speak of being “speedy” and “brainy”, and 
so make reference to their inevitable correlates, presumably ‘slow’ and ‘dumb’.  Who could 
withstand being rated in such hard and harsh categories?  This is how Rancière helps us 
understand the significance of the intricate processes by which democratic political life and 
its corresponding rhetoric is replaced by policing (it is illustrative in this sense that the 
Twitter feeds of the current American president deploy such terms routinely).  The 
continuous “re-distribution of the sensible” becomes the matter of a simple gesture of 
swiping the screen of a mobile phone and, with it, decide whether a colleague’s performance 
is possibly “rubbish”.  In fact, no one even needs go as far: the cursor only has to be placed 
slightly towards that end of the scale for the rating “rubbish” to become effective. 
Are these examples confined to employment contexts and managerialism’s narrow 
sphere of influence?  Or does managerialism extend beyond formal ‘corporate’ organisations, 
indeed reaching and contaminating directly the political institutions of the state itself?  In 
June 2014, the Communist Party in China introduced, through a State Council Notice (that is, 
a decree from the prime-minister’s office), the Planning Outline for the Construction of a 
Social Credit System (2014-2020) (State Council of China 2014).  Initially unnoticed, this 
five-year programme aims to include all citizens in a process of continuous individual 
appraisal of “trustworthiness” using smart-phone rating applications.  The stated goal is to 
“broadly shape a thick atmosphere in the entire society that keeping trust is glorious and 
breaking trust is disgraceful, and ensure that sincerity and trustworthiness become conscious 
norms of action among all the people.” (2014, p. 3)  On 22 November 2018, a news item 
reported that “China blacklists millions of people from booking flights as 'social credit' 
system introduced. Officials say aim is to make it ‘difficult to move’ for those deemed 
‘untrustworthy’” (Cockburn 2018).  This update refers to a document of the Beijing 
Municipality published on 19 November 2018, entitled Action Plan of Beijing Municipality 
for Further Optimizing the Business Environment (2018 - 2020) (Beijing Municipality 2018) 
implementing  the overall national policy at local level.  A passage appearing in Section II, 
subsection IV, point 15 – Speed up the development of a model city of integrity (the same 
notion which concludes Barclays’ text), stipulates that the Municipality ought to, “Establish a 
unified credit 3-list system of reward and punishment in Beijing […] and by the end of 2020 
an ‘individual credit’ project covering the whole permanent population in Beijing.” (2018)  
The spirit of this political system of rating becomes clear when its eventual goals are stated: 
 
Provide those trustworthy with facilitation measures, including “fault tolerance 
acceptance” and “green pass”, and incentive measures for the “Credit+” 
demonstration project.  Improve the credit blacklist system, disclose the records of 
corporate and personal trustworthiness on a regular basis, and establish the 
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punishment layout so that those losing faith in one area shall be restricted everywhere 
and let law-breakers and dishonest persons pay a heavy cost. (ibid.) 
 
By 2020, having completed the first national audit of personal trustworthiness and 
allocated “social credit” to each citizen according to their rating, the programme also aims to 
give “complete rein to mechanisms to encourage keeping trust and punish breaking trust.” 
(State Council of China 2014)  “Trustworthiness”, in this conception, does not remain a mere 
personal trait; to the contrary, it will also become currency and commodity, to be traded as 
“credit products”:  
 
Vigorously spreading the socialized application of credit products, stimulate the 
interaction, exchange, coordination and sharing of credit information, complete 
combined social credit reward and punishment mechanisms, construct a social credit 
environment of sincerity, self-discipline, trust-keeping and mutual trust. (ibid.) 
 
Anticipating this new sphere of commerce with pure ‘moral merchandise’ the process 
of acquiring such personal credit becomes ever-more critical.  For the first time in history 
perhaps, individual performance appraisal becomes state policy.  Direct intervention at the 
level of individual modes of conduct shows how subtle this political instrument aims to be.  It 
does not seek simply to “optimise the business environment”, but to regulate and police the 
criteria through which an individual is allowed into, or excluded from, the political 
community as such.  Democratic participation and contestation are to be replaced by 
performance appraisal and rating systems, attempting to establish a definitive symbolic order 
by which a ‘model’ polity can be constituted.  The question of ‘my personal rating’ moves 
from social media accounts into the records of the political system itself, and from corporate 
management systems into national politics and policies.  What the ubiquitous spread of rating 
systems shows is the force of a language and of a cultural context in which personal 
interactions are placed on a public, yet secretive, stage, and in a negative, yet always 
pretending to be positive, light.  The combined effect is the isolation of individuality against 
any possible collective identification with a genuine demos.  However, the political 
programme unfolding in China is not, as it were, ‘Chinese’.  Rather, its roots lie in the 
consolidation of a global and hegemonic managerial mentality over the last three decades.  It 
can be traced from the model employee, to the model citizen, and to the model city of 
“integrity”. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The question of this article is how managerialism, amplified by recent communication 
technologies, reconfigures the principles and spaces of democratic participation.  We have 
focussed on the logic of performance appraisal systems that now seek to encompass multiple 
facets of organisational lives.  We have illustrated this phenomenon using three 
interconnected examples, spanning the period of (neo)liberalism’s reaffirmation since 1989, 
and have argued that managerialism plays an important role in the consolidation of 
(neo)liberalism as an ethico-political ‘ideal’.  Through rating practices, it pursues the 
establishment and dissemination of normative directions for everyday conduct.  
The examples presented are but a handful of a much broader and sustained trend 
(Lebowitz 2016; Wright 2015).  One of the dangers we have tried to highlight, common to 
Barclays’, McKinsey’s, and China’s programmes, is the marginalisation of possible ethical 
and political spaces of dissent.  We have used Rancière’s concept of “policing” (2010, p. 36) 
to show how these spaces are gradually seized by managerial practices, closing off the 
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possibility of genuine democratic expression.  As he argues, “Consensus means closing 
spaces of dissensus by plugging intervals and patching up any possible gaps between 
appearance and reality, law and fact.” (2010, pp. 71–72)  Appraisal systems such as these 
show how individuals and collectivities are conceived as ethical subjects and how the social 
space of work “shrinks” through normative demands which minimise opportunities for 
“polemic over their [nature]” (ibid.).   
The intimate level at which these systems seek to intervene reveals their potential 
danger.  By seeking to “police” the elementary gesture of rating one’s immediate colleagues 
and oneself, genuine democratic engagement is subjected to increasingly divisive practices.  
The ‘individual’ seems to be placed in a position which,  symbolically and rhetorically, 
claims to strengthen the possibility of participation.  The implication is that rating each other 
as individuals (whether in our private lives, as employees, or as citizens of cities and states) is 
somehow even more democratic than voting itself.  But this is precisely what makes such 
managerial practices so insidious.  On the one hand, the rating process closes off, through 
formalised criteria, any possibility of genuine dissent or contestation.  On the other hand, 
because we rate each other, the “policing” nature of this process requires no other mediating 
institution.  Rating becomes direct and personal “policing” in a novel and dangerous 
reconfiguration of relations of power.  Internalising the moment of political judgement, 
individuals appear empowered when, in fact, they have to carry the responsibility for policing 
their own conduct, while consenting, without recourse, to the established symbolic order.  
Thus the core political process underway is the distribution and ethical reinforcement 
of a weakened sense of individuality.  The language-games through which individuality is 
now constructed (Mouffe 2000, p. 12) re-distribute the sense of ‘selfhood’ so that the 
individual becomes an isolated unit of political thought and action, without resort to a 
recognisable ‘polis’ or ‘demos’.  The political and ethical fabric of everyday life is reduced to 
isolated individuals who have to confront each other as solitary subjects of each other’s 
ratings and judgements.  In addition, the use of seemingly direct and immediate smart 
technologies allows these practices to cover up their interventions by claiming that 
technology no longer requires institutional mediation and that the organisation is no longer 
the prime authority policing the terms of social and political engagement.  Moreover, as 
Serres (2014) shows, reducing rating to a mere swipe of the “thumb” seems to bestow power 
so immediately and effectively upon the individual that it nearly re-constitutes the moment of 
possible political engagement.  If it is possible for ‘me’ to make judgements and decisions on 
the spot by rating, with a simple and minuscule gesture, then  assessing everything and 
everyone  around ‘me’, at any moment, no longer requires a complex collective deliberation 
process.  In other words, as I witness how much my poor ratings affect others, how effective 
they are, do I not acquire the power that once required collective identification and struggle?  
Is there any longer a genuine need for the demos and its deliberative, thinking and debating 
processes?   
How might the pervasiveness of rating in contemporary social interactions be brought 
to light as an ethical and political problem?  This question is not marginal to this inquiry, but 
to explore it fully would be to extend the argument beyond the confines of this article.  
However, it is important to note how pressing this question is, in an age when major 
institutions (from private corporations and various media in which rating takes place, to 
higher education establishments, and beyond) are now operating through such practices 
without any questioning.  The assumption that the problematic character of rating is only a 
technical matter to be ‘fixed’ as the system unfolds, signals how complex efforts of 
substantive critique have to be.   
Because the act of rating seems to claim validity so readily, as if it opens up genuine 
democratic participation and dissent, a radical critique would require sustained, continuous, 
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and systematic dissection.  Perhaps, dissent based on critical thought could be re-kindled, 
once again, through pedagogical engagement, using examples such as performance appraisal 
systems which show how positivity can be used to manufacture consensus.  How might the 
political role of a more critically informed pedagogy be configured in the novel context of the 
Twenty-First Century?  Its task would be to uncover the ethico-political roots and dangers of 
performance appraisals and rating in configuring social interactions in such an intimate and 
invasive manner.  The attempt would then be to question the values on which rating is based 
and the ways in which it defies ideals of equality by forcing the establishment of hierarchies 
by its very nature (such as from one ‘star’ to five). The goal is to recover the values that have 
been gradually excluded or repressed in the name of manufacturing consensus, values of 
genuine “agonistic pluralism” as democracy’s “very condition of existence” (Mouffe 2000, p. 
103) and refusing to allow its suppression by the novel authoritarian and despotic orders of 
the kind managerialism seeks to disseminate. 
This kind of critical effort becomes all the more timely as higher education 
institutions themselves are invaded by managerial initiatives expanding rating to the policing 
of critical thinking itself.  Module evaluation reports, National Student Surveys, national 
Research and Teaching Excellence Frameworks, and now Knowledge Exchange Frameworks 
(in the UK), global university rankings, multiple measures of employability, as well as direct 
peer observation of teaching in the classroom, combined with public ratings of teaching (such 
as “Rate My Professors.com”), various accreditation bodies (such as AACSB, EFMD, 
CABS) – all are themselves modes through which the logic of rating and “policing” of 
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